The situation could be read as a simple trade-off between economic growth and the environment. Actually, it is considerably more complicated. According to the Commission, the costs of reaching the more ambitious target are EUR 81bn, E11bn more than what member states had been prepared to pay to achieve a 20% cut. But the additional investment would be more than recouped by benefits in terms of energy security, air quality and jobs. Despite this, effective lobbying by heavy industry and the unwillingness of some political leaders to countenance anything that prejudices economic growth in the short term, have stymied the ‘ecological modernizers’ in the Commission, who see climate policy as an opportunity to lead the world towards a new, low-carbon industrial revolution.
Since the on-set of the economic downturn, European leaders have routinely prioritised reductions in debt burdens over cuts in emissions. But the failure to increase the target now is short-sighted: sticking at 20% means that future reductions will have to be all the steeper and potentially all the more expensive. Maintaining it also keeps the carbon price at a level well below that needed to convince investors to commit serious money to the low-carbon innovations that are needed to reduce emissions and, crucially, address energy insecurity in the EU.
It also means that consciously or not, EU political leaders are choosing a future in which the world has to adapt to temperature increases significantly in excess of 2°C – the target the Union is, at least officially, still committed to. Impacts, both within the EU and beyond, will begin to be felt, bringing with them potentially heavy economic costs and demands for greater adaptive planning. No doubt some of those countries that are now resisting the 30% target will be calling for financial support to deal with the kinds of extreme events – floods and droughts etc – that are predicted to be more common in a warmer Europe.
While the EU has mastered ‘burden sharing’ in emissions reduction (with the richer member states taking on larger burdens so that poorer states can continue to grow), sharing the costs of adaptation, will present huge new challenges. For example, will German tax payers be willing to bale out flood victims in Poland, and if so, through what institutional mechanism? Reforming the kinds of policies and practices that increase Europe’s vulnerability to climate impacts, such as inappropriate development in flood prone areas, is essential, but will also be politically difficult to achieve. Decisive leadership does seem to be in rather short supply in the EU at present. But the danger is that without it, Europe may end up with a muddled combination of both ineffective mitigation and inadequate adaptation. In short, the worst of all worlds.